is uncertainty regarding important parameters of the model. In particular for the case of firms responding to environmental policy, uncertainty could be associated with output price movements; that is, demand could be affected by stochastic shocks, or technological uncertainty could affect the efficiency of the abatement process. Another type of uncertainty that could be important is policy uncertainty, which in our case can be associated with stochastic movements of tradable emissions prices or unpredictable (from the firms' point of view) policy changes. In all these cases, the analysis of firms' behavior under uncertainty could be important not only in explaining the effects of environmental policy on abatement investment or relocation decisions, but also as a guide for exploring issues of optimal environmental policy design.
A second important factor affecting the same problem is the fact that firms' decisions regarding abatement investment and location have irreversibility characteristics. Thus abatement investment expenses are irreversible once they are incurred by the firms; movement to a new location when the costs of returning to the old location are sufficiently high is also an irreversible decision.
Since abatement investment is a dynamic process of accumulating abatement capital, and the type of uncertainty described undoubtedly embodies a time dimension since output or tradable emissions price evolves dynamically through stochastic processes, it follows that the analysis of firms' responses to environmental policy might be more realistically explored in a dynamic framework. In a dynamic setup, the interaction of uncertainty with the irreversibility characteristics of investment decisions or relocation decisions generates well-known option value issues. 4 Thus, the purpose of the present paper is to explore abatement investment and location responses to environmental policy under uncertainty and irreversibility. The problem is analyzed in a dynamic setup, where uncertainty is modeled by Itô stochastic differential equations, by using optimal stopping methodologies. The idea is to define continuation intervals during which firms do not expand abatement capital or relocate, and intervals during which firms take the irreversible decision to undertake abatement investment expenses or relocate. The optimal stopping methodology will define a free boundary. When a state variable-which could be output price, the price of tradable emissions permits, or a technological coefficient-crosses the boundary, the irreversible decision to increase abatement capital or relocate is taken. The structure of the free boundary determines, therefore, the conditions under which the firm will invest in abatement capital or relocate.
Using this methodological approach, free boundaries are determined or characterized for a variety of cases that include output price uncertainty, policy uncertainty expressed both in terms of continuous fluctuations of permit prices and unpredictable policy changes, and technological uncertainty. The advantage of this approach is that although a complex mathematical model is used, the emerging results regarding the structure of the free boundary are relatively simple and depend on estimable parameters.
Thus it allows the analysis of firms' responses to environmental policy in a framework that combines uncertainty and irreversibility effects. A second advantage of the approach is that when uncertainty is not associated with environmental policy parameters, but is either demand or technological uncertainty, the free boundaries are defined parametrically in terms of policy instruments, such as emissions taxes or abatement investment subsidies. This allows the meaningful performance of comparative statics regarding the irreversible decisions. Thus it is possible, given the parameters characterizing the stochastic processes associated with output price or technological uncertainty, to analyze how firms respond to changes in emissions taxes or abatement subsidies, regarding abatement investment or relocation decisions, by analyzing the shifts of the boundary.
Finally, the optimal stopping approach makes possible the design of optimal policies under uncertainty. The optimal policy is determined such that the firm's free boundary under the optimal policy is identical to a free boundary determined by maximizing the objective function of a regulator. In this case, the firm reaches decisions regarding abatement investment or relocation, given the stochastic movements of the state variables (output price or technological uncertainty), which are the same as the decisions that a regulator would have taken in the same stochastic environment. Thus this methodology introduces an approach to optimal policy design in which, under uncertainty, the target is not to choose the instrument such that the firms choose the same value of the variable of interest (e.g., abatement), but rather the target is to induce them to base their decision rule on the same rule that the regulator would have selected. In this case, the decision rule is determined by the free boundary.
Abatement Investment Decisions under Uncertainty
We assume an industry consisting of n identical firms producing in a small open economy. The firms behave competitively and sell their product in the world market where international competition prevails. We consider the representative firm producing at each instant of time output q(t) at a cost determined by a cost function c(q(t)), with cЈ(q) Ͼ 0, cЉ(q) Ͼ 0. Output is sold in the world market at an exogenous world price p(t).
The production of output generates emissions. Emissions per unit of output are determined by the function E(t) ϭ v(t) e(R(t)), where v(t) Ͼ 0 is an efficiency parameter associated with the abatement process and e (R(t) 
Therefore an increase in abatement capital reduces unit emissions at a decreasing rate, which means that diminishing returns in abatement capital are assumed. Thus, when the firm produces output q(t), total emissions are defined
as v(t) e(R(t)) q(t).
The cost for increasing the stock of accumulated abatement capital by ⌬R is defined as (1 Ϫ s) h⌬R, where h is the exogenous unit-abatement investment cost and s ʦ [0, 1) is a subsidy potentially given by the government to cover some of the expenses for expanding abatement capital. Assume that the firm pays an exogenously determined emission tax (t). Then the tax payments are defined as (t) [ v(t) 
e(R(t)) q(t)].
Given this setup, the firm has to decide about output production and abatement investment. At each time the firm decides about the optimal output level given the stock of abatement capital. Thus output is regarded as an operating variable and output decisions can be regarded as shortrun decisions, while abatement investment decisions are long-run decisions. The optimal choice of output for any given level of abatement capital determines a reduced-form instantaneous profit function, which can be defined as
t q t c q t t v t e R t q t
The first-order conditions for the optimal output choice, assuming interior solutions and dropping t to simplify notation, are given as 5. A more general formulation would be to define the e(и) function as e(R, R AG ), where R AG ϭ nR, is aggregate abatement knowledge. In this case there could be positive spillovers from aggregate abatement capital to the individual abatement function. When firms consider aggregate knowledge as fixed, there is a divergence between the private return of abatement capital and the social return of abatement capital (Xepapadeas 1997b 
Thus an increase in the tax rate or a reduction in the abatement efficiency (increase in v) reduces optimal output, while an increase in the stock of abatement capital increases optimal output. From the short-run comparative statics and the envelope theorem, we obtain the derivatives of the profit function as 
Thus the profit function is convex in prices for fixed (,v, R), decreasing in (,v) , and increasing in R.
Uncertainty can be introduced into this model in three ways. First, it can be assumed that the world demand is affected by stochastic shocks giving rise to a geometric Brownian motion price process. In this case, output price is the exogenous state variable, (2) dp t 7. It is assumed that [eЉ(R)q* ϩ eЈ(R)( q*/R)] Ͼ 0, so that the profit function is concave in R for fixed ( p, , v) . The concavity assumption requires sufficient curvature of the unit emissions function e(R).
8. For definitions see Malliaris and Brock (1982) . 9. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994 Second, it can be assumed that environmental efficiency evolves stochastically according to the geometric Brownian motion:
The interpretation of this type of uncertainty can be associated with the stochastic operating conditions of abatement equipment. It can also be associated with stochastic effects of the general level of abatement knowledge in the economy that is external to the firm, but can affect the firm's abatement efficiency through spillover effects.
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Third, it can be assumed that environmental regulation takes place through a system of tradable permits, in which case (t) can be interpreted as the competitive market price for permits, which can evolve stochastically according to the geometric Brownian motion:
Given the firm's instantaneous profit function (1), the next stage is to define the optimal abatement investment policy for the types of uncertainty described.
Abatement Investment Decisions under Price Uncertainty
Having optimally chosen the output level, the next step is to analyze the decision to undertake new abatement investment, denoted by ⌬R, from the existing abatement capital level of R 0 , under price uncertainty modeled by equation (2) and assuming that (, v, s, h ) are fixed parameters. Consider the firm's decision to undertake new abatement investment by ⌬R from the existing abatement capital level R 0 ; then the new abatement capital level becomes 10. If we consider entry and exit decisions in the world market, then an upper reflecting barrier p to the price movement can be considered. When price moves to the reflecting barrier, new entry is triggered, quantity increases, and price decreases.
11. Stochastic delays in the R&D processes can be modeled by assuming that v follows a Poisson process.
Then v(t) e(R(t)) q(t)
can be interpreted as the excess demand for permits. The expected values and the variances for v(t) and of (t) are defined in a similar way as for p(t).
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The cost of this change in abatement capital is defined as
In the model developed here, the optimal abatement investment strategy takes the form of a free boundary, p ϭ p (R; , v, s, h) , relating price and accumulation of abatement capital. This boundary is parametrically defined for the vector of parameters (,v, s, h) . When observed price p ob is less than p (R; , v, s, h) , no abatement investment is undertaken, while when p ob is greater than p(R; , v, s, h) enough abatement investment is undertaken in the current period to restore equality on the boundary. Changes in the parameter vector (,v, s, h) shift the boundary and can accelerate or decelerate abatement investment accumulation for any given price. Thus we can determine, by using comparative statics associated with the free boundary, the effects of environmental policy on the firm's decision rule regarding abatement investment.
Assume that the initial price is p 0 and the firm's initial abatement capital stock is R 0 . Given a discount rate , the firm seeks the nondecreasing process R(t), which will maximize the present value of profits less the cost of development. The value function 13 associated with this problem can be written as
At each instant of time, the firm has two choices: to undertake the new abatement investment or not. The time interval when no new abatement investment is undertaken and the existing abatement stock is used to determine the unit emission coefficient, can be defined as the continuation interval. A stopping time is defined as a time -at which new abatement investment is undertaken.
Let R*(-) be the optimal development process at time -. If -is a stopping time, then
where R*(-) is the optimal process at time -(see Fleming and Soner 1993) . Assume that in the time interval [0, ], the firm undertakes no new 13 . By the concavity of the profit function in R and the linear dynamics, the value function is also concave in R (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . abatement investment, but keeps it constant at R 0 . By the principle of dynamic programming, the value function should be no less than the continuation payoff in the interval [0, ], plus the expected value after , or
with equality if R 0 is the optimal policy in [0, ]. Applying Itô 's lemma to the value function on the right-hand side of equation (8), dividing by , and taking limits as → 0, we find that the value function should satisfy
Consider now the decision to undertake abatement investment instantaneously by ⌬R ϭ R 0ϩ Ϫ R 0 . Then from the definition of the optimal stopping time, we have
Since the value function is concave in R, the optimal abatement investment flow can be obtained by maximizing the right-hand side of inequality (10). The necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal abatement investment choice is
with equality if ⌬R Ͼ 0. Thus when no new abatement investment is optimal, inequality (9) is satisfied as equality, whereas when new abatement investment is optimal, inequality (11) is satisfied as equality. Combining inequalities (9) and (11), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation can be written as (12) min ( , , , ) ,
The optimal free boundary will divide the (p, R) space into two regions: the "no new abatement investment" region, which we call region I, and the "new abatement investment" region, which we call region II.
In region I, the first term of the HJB equation (12) is 0, since ⌬R ϭ 0, 14. Subscripts associated with the value function denote partial derivatives.
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and the second term of the HJB equation is positive by inequality (11); while in region II, the second term of equation (12) 
Proof. See the appendix.
The solution of the value function V( p, R) indicates that the maximized expected value consists of the term ⌸( p, R; , v), which can be interpreted as the present value of net profits when abatement capital is kept constant, and the term A 1 (R)p ␤ 1 , which is the current value of the option to expand abatement capacity. When the firm increases abatement capital, it sacrifices the option value of the incremental abatement capacity; thus AЈ 1 (R) Ͻ 0. Therefore an increase in abatement is desirable if its contribution to net profit ⌸ R ( p, R; , v), realized through savings in emissions taxes less the cost of giving up the option to wait AЈ 1 (R)p ␤ 1 , equals the marginal expansion cost (1 Ϫ s)h. The free boundary p(R; , v, s, h) can be determined for estimated parameter values that characterize the price process, the cost structure, and the discount rate. Since p(R) Ͼ 0, the free boundary is defined for parameter values such that c(1 Ϫ s) h Ͼ | ve(R)eЈ(R) |. In order to describe the free boundary we have, by the assumptions on the unit emissions function, p(0) Ͼ 0 and lim R→∞ p(R) ϭ ϩ∞. Furthermore,
The free boundary is shown in figure 9.1. For any given level of abatement capital, random price fluctuations move the point (R, p) vertically upward or downward. If the point goes above the boundary, then new abatement investment is immediately undertaken so that the point shifts on the boundary. Thus optimal abatement capital accumulation proceeds gradually. In the terminology of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , this is a "barrier control" policy. By inverting the free-boundary function p(R; , v, s, h), we can obtain the optimal boundary function R* ϭ p Ϫ1 ( p; z), which determines the optimal abatement investment boundary as a function of the state variable p and the vector z of the parameters of the problem. For price movements to the right of the boundary, new abatement investment is undertaken. If price stays on the left of the boundary, no new abatement investment is undertaken.
If price follows a mean reverting process, then the HJB equation for region I that corresponds to equation (12) The steps for solving for the optimal boundary are the same as before; however, due to the more complicated structure of equation (12Ј), the analysis of the effects of mean reversion requires numerical solutions (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994) .
The Impact of Changes in Policy Parameters
We can examine the shifts of the free boundary in response to changes in the tax parameter or the subsidy parameter s. These effects are determined as 
Thus an increase in the tax rate or the subsidy rate shifts the boundary downward and induces more abatement investment for any given price level, as is also shown in figure 9.1. An increase in the tax rate might not, however, increase abatement investment if there is a drop in prices below the boundary. This is because the reduction in equilibrium output and the 
A reduction in abatement efficiency induces more abatement investment for any given price level.
Optimal Environmental Policy
In section 9.2.2 the tax and the subsidy parameters were treated as fixed. The analysis can, however, be extended to analyze the case of an environmental regulator who can choose the policy parameters optimally. Optimal policy choice is considered in the following way. From proposition 1, the free boundary that determines the profit-maximizing abatement investment depends on the tax and subsidy parameters. Consider the case of an environmental regulator that determines a socially optimal free boundary by explicitly taking into account environmental damages. An optimal environmental policy can then be defined by determining the values of the policy parameters such that the profit-maximizing free boundary will coincide with the socially optimal free boundary, as determined by the environmental regulator. Define a social profit function by
where D(v(t)e(R(t))q(t))
is a strictly increasing and convex damage function. By following the steps in section 9.2.1, a free boundary that determines the socially optimal abatement investment under price uncertainty can be defined. Denote this free boundary by p s (R), and consider the free boundary defined in proposition 1 as a function of the policy parameters, or p(R; , s). An optimal environmental policy can be defined as the pair ( *, *) : ( ; *, *) ( ).
A solution of the form * ϭ (s*) will determine the trade-off between emissions taxes and abatement investment subsidies in the design of environmental policy.
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In the simplest possible case of constant marginal damages at the level d, the optimal trade-off is determined as * ϭ d(1 Ϫ s). The tax rule for this case is very simple and, given the parameters of the model and output price observations, the regulator can determine the firms' responses regarding abatement investment.
It is interesting to note that under uncertainty and irreversibility, the optimal environmental policy equates the privately optimal and the socially optimal free boundaries and not the privately optimal and the socially optimal levels of the choice variables as in the case of optimal policy design under certainty.
Abatement Investment Decisions under Environmental Policy or Abatement Efficiency Uncertainty
When, under fixed prices, the environmental policy uncertainty is present in the form of stochastic evolution of prices for tradable emissions permits, or abatement efficiency is stochastic, then the mathematical treatment is similar, although the sources of uncertainty are different. Policy uncertainty can be regarded as uncertainty outside the firm, while abatement uncertainty can be regarded as internal to the firm. So although the mathematical results are the same, their interpretation and their policy implications are different.
In the case of policy uncertainty, the HJB equation can be written as
.
As before, the optimal free boundary will divide the (,R) space into two regions: the "no new abatement investment" region (region I) and the "new abatement investment" region (region II). 
Proposition 2. For the quadratic cost function defined in proposition 1, the value function and the free boundary are determined as
V R B R p R v B R V R B R p R v s h R R R R R ( , ) ( ) ( , ; , ),( ) , ( , ) ( ) ( , ; , ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( )( / )
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The interpretations of the value function and the free boundary are similar to those under price uncertainty.
Using the assumptions about the unit-emissions function we have
If the free boundary is monotonic, a property that can be checked by using specific functions, then its graph is shown in figure 9. 2.
An increase of the policy parameter above the boundary induces more abatement investment. By inverting the (R) function, an optimal boundary function for abatement capital accumulation in terms of the policy parameter is defined as R* ( , ). = 
Then the free boundary can be defined in the context of correlated policy and technological uncertainty, as in the previous case of policy uncertainty.
Unpredictable Policy Changes
Policy uncertainty as analyzed previously is associated with continuous fluctuations of the tradable-emissions-permit price. It is possible, however, for a sudden change in policy due, for example, to an unexpected (from the firm's point of view) change in the supply of permits, to cause a discontinuous change in their price. In the context of our model, this unpredictable change introduces jump characteristics. Thus, while the usual fluctuations in prices are captured by the geometric Brownian motion, the sudden policy change should be captured by a Poisson process. Therefore, the price of permits is modeled by a mixed Brownian motion and jump process, or
where dq P is the increment of a Poisson process with a mean arrival time of the change in the supply of permits . We further assume that the change in the supply of permits represents an increase and that this causes a fixed drop in the price 16 by a known percentage ʦ [0, 1] with probability 1, and that dz and dq P are independent. To analyze this problem, the HJB equation is derived by using Itô 's lemma for combined Brownian motion and jump process (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . Then the HJB equation can be written as min ( , ; , )
The solution to the value function is The analysis of policy uncertainty provides a general way of analyzing firms' reactions to environmental policy. Given the structure of the free boundary, which can be determined for estimated parameter values, the regulator can obtain the firms' reactions to a wide range of policy changes using a unified model.
Location Decisions
When we examine location decisions, the problem can also be defined as an optimal stopping problem. In the waiting or continuation region, the firm stays in its present location, pays the emissions tax, and follows the optimal abatement capital-accumulation path, R*(t), given uncertainty described by the evolution of the state variable (price, policy parameter, or technology parameter).
Suppose that the firm examines the possibility of relocation to a new location (country) where there is no environmental policy. Assume that the setup costs are fixed, F, and are incurred once at the time of relocation, that the cost function remains the same, and that there are no transportation costs.
17 Suppose that relocation takes place at time t d ; then the profit function for the firm that chooses optimally operating output is defined as
Assuming that price uncertainty exists, then at each period of time the firm faces a binary choice:
1. Relocate and take the termination payoff defined as
2. Continue operation at the initial location for one period, choosing output and abatement investment optimally; receive the operating profits; and then consider another binary choice in the next period.
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17. See the proofs of propositions 1 and 2 in the appendix for these conditions.
The Bellman equation for this problem can be written as
In the continuation region, the first term on the right-hand side is the largest. Using Itô 's lemma on this term, we obtain the usual differential equation, 
, ). =
This is the value-matching condition. The smooth-pasting condition requires that
Conditions (16) and (17) can be used to determine the constant K 1 and the free boundary p ϭ p*(t d ). By inverting the boundary equation we obtain the optimal relocation time boundary function t* d ϭ p* Ϫ1 ( p). This boundary determines the critical relocation time as a function of the observed price for given values of the parameters , v, and s.
Environmental policy uncertainty or abatement efficiency uncertainty can be treated in the same way. Suppose that policy uncertainty exists in the sense of stochastic permit prices. Then, following the same steps as before, the free boundary ϭ *(t d ) is defined by the following conditions, using the quadratic cost function: Using these conditions, the free boundary *(t) is implicitly defined by 18. Alternative assumptions could include the existence of a different environmental policy abroad, for example command and control regulation, or differences in the political systems that affect the stringency of environmental policy.
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By inverting the boundary function *(t d ), we obtain the optimal relocation time boundary function t* d ϭ * Ϫ1 () in terms of the environmental policy parameter and the rest of the parameters of the problem. Optimal relocation implies the existence of a threshold policy parameter such that when the actual policy parameter crosses this threshold, relocation takes place. This result is stated in the following proposition. This proposition implies that for any time t a threshold environmental policy parameter exists such that when the policy parameter exceeds the threshold, the firm moves to the new location. The relation between the threshold policy parameter and the optimal relocation time is shown in figure 9 .3, where indicates the permit price that induces immediate relocation. The lower the permit price, the further away the optimal relocation time is. When the permit price crosses the boundary, it is optimal to take the irreversible relocation decision. Similar analyses, although with different interpretations, can be applied to the case where uncertainty relates to abatement efficiency, or to correlated policy and abatement uncertainty.
The analysis suggests that since firms are identical, they will relocate simultaneously when the critical time arrives. If firms are heterogeneous regarding characteristics of production cost or abatement technologies, then the optimal relocation time will be different across firms. In this case, there will more than one boundary such as the one depicted in figure 9.3. cal framework characterized by uncertainty and irreversibilities. The optimal stopping time methodology adopted in this paper makes it possible to analyze firms' responses to environmental policy in terms of the impact that this environmental policy has on the barrier control policies followed by firms regarding their profit-maximizing decisions. The analysis of environmental policy impacts through their effects on barrier control policies makes it possible to view these impacts as shifts of a free boundary that determines firms' policies regarding abatement investment or relocation decisions. In this sense the approach developed in this paper can be regarded as another way of analyzing the effects of regulatory policy under conditions of uncertainty and irreversibility. Despite the mathematical complexity of the approach, the effects of regulatory policies on the free boundary are determined by parameters related to the stochastic process associated with uncertainty and the firms' production structure, which are in principle estimable. It is also possible to use the optimal stopping time methodology in order to design optimal environmental policy under uncertainty and irreversibility, in the sense of choosing the policy parameters so that the free boundary, or equivalently the optimal policy function under profit maximization, coincides with the socially optimal free boundary (abatement-investmentpolicy function). The implication of this approach regarding optimal policy design under price uncertainty and irreversibility is that a regulator can in principle design a policy scheme consisting of two instruments: an emissions tax or a tradable permit system, and a subsidy on abatement investment. The policy scheme takes into account uncertainty through its dependence on the parameters of the price process and will induce individual firms to undertake the same output and abatement investment under uncertainty that a regulator would have undertaken. In this sense, the policy mix of emissions taxes (or emissions permits) and abatement investment subsidies will be welfare maximizing. It should be noticed that the function * ϭ (s*), determining the optimal trade-off between taxes and subsidies, allows the regulator to determine the policy mix in order to obtain an optimal balance between the output-contracting pollution control by emissions taxes and pollution control through the subsidization of the accumulation of abatement capital. A similar mix of emissions taxes (or emissions permits) and abatement investment subsidies can be used to affect location decisions. By linking location decisions to subsidies in emissions-reducing abatement investment, it was possible to derive rules relating to the amount of subsidy required in order not to accelerate relocation after the introduction of a stricter environmental policy. Given the function that determines optimal relocation time as a function of the observed price, an increase in emissions taxes may induce relocation of all or a subset of firms, depending on the heterogeneity assumptions, by bringing relocation time forward at the same price level. If relocation is not desirable, it may be prevented by an appropriate increase in the abatement subsidy. On the other hand, if price movements in the world market induce relocation, our results indicate that it could be prevented by an appropriate change of the policy mix, that is, changes in emissions taxes and/or abatement subsidies.
Further research could be directed toward the study of the relocation time when the country abroad follows a different environmental policy, or when the firms in the home country are heterogeneous. Further research could also be directed toward the study of the socially optimal relocation time. The optimal-stopping-time methodology could indicate the time at which it is socially desirable for a firm to relocate, and then help to design a policy scheme to prevent suboptimal relocation decisions. 
is the positive root; ␤ 2 is the corresponding negative root of the fundamental quadratic,
and ⌸( p, R; , v) is the particular solution. We need to disregard the negative root in order to prevent the value from becoming infinitely large when the price tends to 0; thus we set A 2 (R) ϭ 0 (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . So the solution becomes
In order to obtain tractable results we need a better specification of the particular solution. To obtain such a specification, we consider a quadratic cost function c(q) ϭ 1 ⁄2cq 2 ; then the profit function becomes ( , , , )
Using the method of undetermined coefficients, we obtain the particular solution as 
, .
ve R c ve R c a c a a a
In region II the second term of equation (12) is satisfied as 0 and ⌬R Ͼ 0, or
Solving equation (A5) for p in terms of R, we can write the yet unspecified boundary equation as p ϭ p(R). From equations (A2) and (A5) we can determine the unknown functions A 1 (R) and p ϭ p(R) using the valuematching and the smooth-pasting conditions. 20 The value-matching condition means that on the boundary separating the two regions, the two value functions should be equal. Then we have, combining equations (A2) and (A5) and substituting for p,
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20. For a presentation of these conditions, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) .
The smooth-pasting condition means that the derivatives of the value functions with respect to p on the boundary are equal, or Combining equations (A6) and (A7), we can solve for the unknown functions p(R) and AЈ 1 (R) to obtain
is the equation of the free boundary, which can be written, after substituting for ⌫Ј 0 (R) and ⌫Ј 1 (R), as
Proof of Proposition 2
In region I, the first term of the HJB equation is 0, since ⌬R ϭ 0, and the second term of the HJB equation is positive. Thus in region I,
The general solution of this second-order differential equation can be obtained as before as In region II, the second term of the HJB equation is satisfied as 0 and ⌬R Ͼ 0, or
The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions imply that Since m() is decreasing in , continuation-that is, no relocation-should be optimal when is low.
Assume that the cumulative distribution ⌽(Ј | ) of the future values of the policy parameter shifts uniformly to the left as increases, so that the disadvantages of an increase in the current value of the environmental policy parameter in the original location are unlikely to be reversed in the future. This assumption, along with the decreasing m() function, implies that GЈ() Ͻ 0 (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994, app. B) .
Therefore, the second argument of equation (A14) is decreasing in . Thus, a unique critical time *(tЈ) exists such that the second argument of equation (A14) is negative if and only if o (tЈ) Ͼ *(tЈ). Then it is optimal to relocate (optimal to stop) at time tЈ. If o (tЈ) Ͻ *(tЈ), then it is optimal to remain at the initial site (continue).
